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Executive summary 
 
This case study is about the use of sexual violence against women and men in order to deter 
the opposition from engaging in protests and demonstrations in a context of a country in 
transition, Egypt.  
 
The paper advances a number of arguments. First, politically motivated sexual violence has 
a number of distinguishing features from the socially motivated sexual harassment that is 
generally prevalent in society. While they both contribute to discouraging women from 
assuming an active public role, they have different implications vis-a-vis who to hold 
accountable. Second, men have also been the targets of sexual assault, though their 
narratives have rarely been documented or recognised, and the law does not offer 
possibilities for redress. Third, due to a number of historical and contextual factors 
associated with Egypt – which has been in the throes of revolutionary activism – there has 
been a strong call for the perpetrators to be tried and the government to be held accountable 
for complicity. This has, in turn, reactivated calls for the revision of the criminal code to be 
more effective as a tool for addressing sexual violence.  
 
This report draws on primary and secondary data in both Arabic and English. In order to 
understand the dynamics of politically motivated sexual assault, five in-depth interviews were 
conducted with women and men who have been the victim of various forms of physical and 
sexual assault. As well as this, the author uses testimonies gathered by El Nadim Center for 
Victims of Torture and Trauma, as well as material from 16 focus groups (conducted across 
five governorates), in order to acquire a sense of the perceptions of the wider population on 
sexual assault and women’s own experiences in Egypt.  
 
The author discusses how politically motivated sexual assault assumes the following pattern: 
(i) it occurs in squares and public spaces associated with protests; (ii) it takes place in these 
spaces during times of protests and demonstrations; (iii) the victims are disproportionately 
activists, whether women or men; (iv) sexual violence is used in conjunction with other forms 
of violence; (v) sexual violence is not enacted on a one-to-one basis but through a group of 
men, simultaneously assaulting the woman collectively; and (vi) sexual assault does not 
happen in a passing moment, but is sustained over a period of time.  
 
By engaging with politically motivated sexual violence, this paper draws attention to the 
importance of breaking the silence around men’s experiences of sexual violence. It 
emphasises the importance of being aware of social taboos against acknowledging men’s 
vulnerability to sexual assault, as well as the ways in which homophobia and deeply 
entrenched normative values about what constitutes masculinity and manhood undermine 
prospects of recognising and redressing sexual violence against men.  
 
The paper shows how there has been a shift in public opinion from celebrating the image of 
women participating in Tahrir Square to believing that women should avoid such protest 
spaces because they are too dangerous. If the voices captured in the focus groups are 
indicative of the mood regarding women’s activism, then one can assert that fear has been 
instilled in the hearts of many women and their families, and it is unlikely that women’s 
presence in Tahrir Square will be anything like it was two years ago when millions 
participated in protests. Hence if one of the intentions of politically motivated sexual assault 
was to instil fear within the wider polity, it seems to have by and large succeeded.  
 
However, among revolutionary forces and the opposition, the exposure of these politically 
motivated acts of assault in the media and by human rights organisations seems to have 
strengthened the demand for greater accountability from the government to ensure the safety 
of all citizens. One of the most important platforms for change has been the quest for revision 
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of the existing criminal code, in order for it to serve as an effective instrument to recognise 
and criminalise such action.  
 
The existing penal code initially drawn in 1937 fails to explicitly define rape, sexual assault 
and harassment. The existing articles neither recognise the multiple ways in which people 
are subjected to sexual violence (i.e. not only through vaginal penetration) nor does it 
recognise that women can be the perpetrators of sexual violence, just as men can also be 
the victims. However, until the law is revised, the existing articles (267, 368 and 269) should 
be applied by judges to bring perpetrators to justice. The government must also adopt a 
zero-tolerance policy towards the use of sexual violence by publicly condemning such acts, 
and ensuring that the General Prosecution is immune from any political pressures that would 
undermine its independence.  
 
Recommendations 
 
For donors 
  
1. Politically motivated sexual violence is not only important to study in contexts of war and 
conflict, but also in the context of transition. Comparisons with occurrences in Libya, 
Tunisia and Yemen (also in transition) may be particularly useful.  
2. Raise in policy dialogues with the Egyptian government the need to convey a zero-
tolerance policy towards all forms of gender and sexual based violence against women 
and men.  
3. Support independent media, social media, citizen media and mass media in exposing, 
naming and shaming sexual violence 
4. Support further research on sexual violence against men, and encourage its integration 
into mainstream policy work 
5. Support initiatives that strengthen civil society actors’ awareness of how to use 
international law for advocacy on politically motivated sexual violence where national 
laws fall short. 
 
For civil society 
 
1. Recognise the causes of different forms of sexual violence. In some instances, shaming 
is not enough. There is a need for naming the perpetrators where there is evidence for it.  
2. Encourage  the media to continue to feature persons who will share their accounts of 
sexual assault. 
3. Work with the media to support the positive representation of these men and women, not 
as victims whose honour has been tarnished, but as citizens demanding their rights for 
accountability and justice.  
4. Continue to press the National Women’s Council and the Human Rights Council, as well 
as other quasi-governmental organisations  to urge policymakers to recognise politically 
motivated sexual assault. 
5. Acknowledge sexual violence against men, actively support its coverage, and take efforts 
to break the silence around it and de-tabooise it. 
6. Examine the possibility of resorting to international instruments for seeking justice if the 
local ones do not deliver. For example, in view of the level of physical brutality which 
accompanied the rape and sexual assault of women in Tahrir Square on 25 January 
2011, it may be worthwhile to examine whether these amount to crimes against humanity 
and therefore can be referred to the international court of criminal justice. 
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For government 
 
1. Reform Law 58 of 1937 along the lines suggested by the coalition on sexual violence.  
2. Enforce the existing law until a new one is issued. 
3. Give clear signals that there is a zero-tolerance policy towards the use of sexual violence 
for political purposes, and towards those who disseminate messages that legitimise or 
encourage it.              
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Introduction 
 
This paper examines the increasing politicisation of sexual assault in Egypt’s transition after 
the ousting of the Mubarak regime in 2011. It explores the use of sexual violence by the 
military that held power between January and November 2011, and the ways in which sexual 
assaults subsequently assumed a more insidious form when deployed by the Islamists. 
Incidents of sexual violence under the Islamist regime in power assumed a pattern 
suggesting that they were pre-planned, orchestrated, and collectively organised to target 
protestors and citizens systematically as a form of political cleansing.  
 
The author of this paper advances a number of arguments. First, politically motivated sexual 
violence has a number of features that distinguish it from ordinary sexual harassment. 
Second, men have also been the targets of sexual assault in addition to women, though their 
narratives have rarely been captured or recognised. Third, the law does not offer possibilities 
for redress for either men or women. Fourth, due to a number of historical and contextual 
factors associated with a country that has been in the throes of revolutionary activism, there 
has been a strong call for the perpetrators to be tried and the government to be held 
accountable for complicity. This has, in turn, reactivated calls for the revision of the criminal 
code in order to be more effective as a tool for addressing sexual violence.  
 
The paper draws on primary and secondary data in both Arabic and English. In order to 
understand the dynamics of politically motivated sexual assault, five in-depth interviews were 
conducted with women and men who have been the victim of various forms of physical and 
sexual assault. These were complemented with the testimonies gathered by El Nadim Centre 
for Victims of Torture and Trauma which psychologist Farah Shash compiled and presented 
in a background paper commissioned for this initiative. Interviews were also undertaken with 
human rights activists and one lawyer. Press and media reports in Arabic and English as well 
as scholarly and gray literature were also reviewed. Finally, 16 focus groups were conducted 
in five governorates with the following geographic coverage: the urban capital (Cairo), the 
Delta (Fayoum), and Upper Egypt (Minya, Qena and Beni Suef). The focus groups sought to 
cover both urban and rural contexts. Within each community, the four focus groups included 
men and women (though held separately). While the findings of the focus groups cannot be 
generalised for the entire population, they provide insights into the perceptions of different 
groups on violence, sexual assault and where the responsibility lies.  
 
The first part of the paper reviews the debates in scholarly literature on sexual violence, 
conflict and agency, and defines how these concepts are used in this paper. The second part 
of the paper is a historical briefing on the prevalence of different forms of sexual violence 
until the revolution in 2011, and the military’s use of sexual assault in its engagement with 
the protestors in the aftermath of Mubarak’s relinquishment of power. It also examines the 
emergence of a pattern of systematic, pre-orchestrated and collectively organised targeting 
of protestors in oppositional spaces, and the use of hard and soft power by the Islamists in 
power. The third part of the paper sheds light on the multiple agential expressions of men’s 
engagement with sexual violence including incidents of their own assault. It then addresses 
the motives behind politically motivated sexual assault. The fifth part discusses the normative 
religio-social norms and values prevalent, and how people relate to sexual assault. The 
extent to which legal advocacy and the use of the law can be used to hold perpetrators 
accountable and bring justice to the victims is discussed in the final part of the paper.  
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1  Politically motivated sexual violence: 
understanding the phenomenon 
 
Up until the 1990s, there was a paucity of literature on sexual violence in contexts of conflict 
and war, reflecting a more general culture of silence on the matter. The wide-scale use of 
sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and the DRC Congo brought the issue to 
the fore. It revealed that sexual violence needs to be explicitly recognised in its own right, 
and not subsumed under the category of torture (Woods 2008).  
 
There is now a growing body of literature on sexual violence in the contexts of armed 
struggles, conflict and war (Sjoberg and Via 2010; Butler et al. 2007; Wood 2008; Zinnstag 
2006; Solangon and Patel 2012; Christian et al. 2011; Moser and Clark 2001; Jacobs et al. 
2000; and Enloe 2000). Nevertheless, very little literature tackles the use of sexual violence 
in political struggles in non-war contexts of transition, or by authoritarian regimes dealing with 
internal opposition.  
 
This paper draws on the above-mentioned scholarship of sexual assault in war settings, 
while recognising that sexual violence varies in prevalence, form, targets (women and men), 
perpetrators ( individuals or collectives), motives and duration (Wood 2008: 333). However, 
irrespective of these varied dynamics, across the literature it is clear that all forms of sexual 
violence are intended to subjugate, humiliate and represent an assault on persons’ bodily 
integrity.  
 
The definition of politically motivated sexual violence used in this paper needs to be 
addressed on two levels: first, what is meant by sexual violence; and second, what is meant 
by politically motivated assault.  
 
Sexual violence here draws on the Human Rights Watch definition as ‘an overarching term 
used to describe ‘any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means 
or by targeting sexuality’ (HRW 2003: 2). Sexual violence includes rape and attempted rape, 
and such acts as forcing a person to strip naked in public, forcing victims to perform sexual 
acts on one another or harm one another in a sexual manner, mutilating a person’s genitals 
or a woman’s breasts, and sexual slavery’ (ibid.). Such a definition applies to both women 
and men.  
 
The definition of politically motivated violence draws on Moser’s categorisation and 
conceptualisation of violence (2001: 36) in which political violence is defined as ‘the 
commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or 
maintain political power’. Such political violence is manifest in the use of various forms of 
sexual abuse as political acts. These may include rape, sexual torture and sexual abuse, as 
well as forced pregnancy and sterilisation. Politically motivated sexual violence may be 
instigated by guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict or armed conflict between political parties 
etc.  
 
For Moser, political violence is to be distinguished from economically motivated violence that 
involves the ‘commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious for 
economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power’: these would be manifest in 
abductions and rape during economic crimes. It is also to be distinguished from social 
violence –  violent acts committed by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to 
obtain or maintain social power. This would be manifest at the interpersonal level through 
spouse abuse or sexual harassment by gangs, thugs or various public actors (2001). 
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Moser’s demarcations of political, economic and social violence are not rigidly set, and often 
violence involves the intersection of political, economic and social factors. However, this 
categorisation is useful because it stimulates an analysis of the motives behind the 
perpetration of violence in each category. This distinction between politically, economically 
and socially motivated violence is particularly important for understanding and engaging with 
sexual violence in the cases described here. The Egyptian context involves violent conflict 
between those in power and the opposition, though it has not quite – at the time of writing – 
reached a state of civil war. This is critically important because although the quality of 
governance is poor, there is a government in place that has substantial control over state 
apparatus – unlike conditions of civil war where there is no government and the country is in 
a state of chaos.  
 
It is imperative not to confuse social violence with politically motivated violence in the 
Egyptian context analysed here. Sexual violence in the form of social violence and 
harassment has been a persistent problem in Egypt for many years. Its perpetrators are 
motivated by diverse factors, including individual desires to enforce their dominion over 
women in the street, to have a ‘good time’ and ‘entertain’ themselves, and out of a perceived 
sense of sexual deprivation as a consequence of economic factors making marriage 
expensive and prohibitive. The problem has been accentuated by the lax security situation. 
Incidents of sexual harassment have been documented in heavily crowded areas during 
particular times in the year (downtown Cairo on eid days and during moulids etc). However, 
they have also been reported by women in their day to day lives – walking on the street, 
commuting via public transport, at work and on educational premises. Harassment often 
takes a verbal as well as a physical form (groping, removal of clothing and sometimes rape).  
 
In contrast to social violence, political forces who resort to sexual violence usually plan their 
crime, and synchronise its use with other political initiatives and strategies that aim to 
eliminate the opposition. The implications for strategies of addressing these two phenomena 
have some distinct divergences. In both socially and politically motivated sexual assault there 
is a need to address the social values of society and support human rights organisations to 
press for accountability and provide support for victims. However, where sexual assault is 
politically motivated by a regime in power, it is much more difficult to seek law enforcement 
from the police and from the government when they are suspected of being complicit in the 
acts themselves. In such instances, collective mobilisation against the government is 
needed, in addition to seeking recourse through international means (criminal courts and 
other mechanisms).  
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2  Politically motivated sexual violence from 
Mubarak’s to Morsi’s reign 
 
Politically motivated sexual violence is often exercised in conjunction with other forms of 
violence in a bid to enforce or consolidate power and eliminate the opposition. Under 
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, soft and hard forms of power were exercised to co-opt, 
contain and terrorise oppositional figures and movements which included the use of both 
media vilification campaigns as well as incarceration and torture. It is in this context that 
sexual violence was used against both men and women. Most acts of sexual violence 
(including threats to use sexual violence against the person or female acquaintances) 
occurred in police stations, the secret political police’s premises and in prisons. However, in 
2005, a female reporter was publically stripped of her clothes by men who were believed to 
be hired thugs of the regime. The incident was nationally and internationally condemned. The 
incidents of sexual violence against women protestors in public spaces during Mubarak’s 
reign were rare – possibly because the number of women that joined protests were 
substantially lower, and possibly because the regime was especially sensitive to avoid a 
scandal in the international media.  
 
The Egyptian revolution has been hailed as an example of protestors adopting a non-violent 
ethos in their engagement with the enemies (Ezzabawy 2012). In retrospect, the 
revolutionary struggle to remove Mubarak involved much bloodshed and violence. Tahrir 
Square, which came to symbolise the revolutionary spirit of Egypt, assumed an especially 
esteemed status: it was associated with images of men and women standing side by side in 
protest, Christians and Muslims joining together in prayers, and activists from different 
ideological affiliations working together towards a common cause. Tahrir square became a 
symbol of the exercise of a new form of citizenship that was not mediated by gender 
hierarchies: women slept overnight in tents set up in the middle of the square; they led 
marches and gave speeches, and mobilised others to join in large numbers. 
 
The abdication of Mubarak saw the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) assume 
power, a gesture that was initially welcomed by a large part of the citizenry as a transitory 
step until a civilian government could be elected. However, the slogan of ‘the army and the 
people are one hand’ became increasingly contested as various revolutionary youth 
coalitions, opposition parties, social movements and groups began to voice their opposition 
to SCAF’s monopolisation of power (Ali 2012: 161). In reaction, SCAF deployed the military 
police, special forces and paratroopers in tandem with the central security forces belonging 
to the Ministry of Interior in order to repress the political opposition to its governance of the 
transitional phase (Ali 2012: 161). During this period, an informal entente was forged 
between the Muslim Brotherhood (the country’s most organised political actor) and SCAF, 
and relations were by and large positive, with the latter actively playing a role in suppressing 
opposition to the army.  
 
Throughout 2011 and 2012, both SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood used a number of 
strategies to inhibit the opposition, one of which was sexual violence. Such acts of sexual 
violence were used by the ruling powers against demonstrators and citizens in protest 
spaces, or in close proximity thereof. Some of the incidents were perpetrated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafi forces while SCAF was in power and were heightened in the period 
following President Morsi’s (the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader) rise to power in July 2012. The 
identities of the perpetrators were known by their own identification of themselves and their 
discourse and attire (as will be discussed below). Other incidents of sexual violence were 
carried out by unidentifiable men, who are believed to have been hired for the purpose of 
terrorising protestors through physical and sexual violence. There is no definitive evidence of 
who paid them. Many youth groups and feminist groups have come out and categorically 
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accused the Muslim Brotherhood of being behind commissioning such acts, as will be 
discussed below. Despite differences in how sexual violence was used, who were behind the 
acts and when they took place, there is reason to believe that they were politically motivated 
acts on the basis of two reasons: first, the targeting of protestors in particular; and second, 
the enactment of these incidents in spaces and at times when protests were occurring (such 
as Tahrir Square).  
 
It is difficult to determine when the first incident of sexual assault against protestors in Tahrir 
Square occurred, in view of the social stigma associated with this kind of violence which may 
deter victims from reporting it. However, the first widely publicised incident of sexual assault 
against women protestors occurred one month after Mubarak had stepped down. On  
9 March 2011, a group of women were protesting in Tahrir Square demanding the 
recognition of women’s rights in Egypt. Men attacked some of the female demonstrators, 
molesting them and putting their hands inside their underclothing. Also on the same day, the 
military police arrested and detained at least 18 of the women. Seventeen of them were held 
for four days during which time they were beaten, subjected to electric shocks, stripped of 
their clothes, forced to undergo virginity tests and threatened with prostitution charges 
(Amnesty International 2012). The military admitted to the actions, and one military 
spokesman argued, ‘We didn't want them to say we had sexually assaulted or raped them, 
so we wanted to prove that they weren't virgins in the first place,’ (Zaltsman 2012). He 
added, ‘The girls who were detained were not like your daughter or mine. These were girls 
who had camped out in tents with male protesters in Tahrir Square, and we found in the tents 
Molotov cocktails and [drugs].’ (Zaltsman 2012). The above statement was intended to 
discourage people from empathising with these women by ‘othering’ them as deviant, 
promiscuous, lacking in respectability and nothing like the daughters one would have in one’s 
own family. Samira Ibrahim filed a lawsuit against the military doctor who had tested her to 
see if her virginity was intact. However, a year later, he was acquitted by a military court of all 
charges (Amnesty 2012).  
 
The Supreme Council of Armed Forces’ engagement with the citizenry may bear strong 
resonance with literature on militarism and its production of normative values regarding 
manhood and violent masculinity (Enloe 2000; Sjoberg and Via 2010). Militarised masculinity 
projects notions of what it is to be a man including dominance and control over women who 
are perceived as weaker beings. However, militarised masculinity has limited explanatory 
power in shedding light on why SCAF resorted to sexual violence in some incidents and 
refrained in other instances. The army went down to the streets on 28 January. It stationed 
several military vehicles in Tahrir Square on that day and for the period that followed. For the 
next 15 days until Mubarak was ousted, the army was not implicated in any incidents of 
sexual violence against women or men. In the months during which SCAF governed the 
country, several protests were organised by the Islamists in Tahrir Square, yet there were no 
reported incidents of assault on the women or men affiliated to the Islamist movements. The 
incidents of sexual assault against women and men perpetrated by the army were 
consistently enacted against protestors challenging SCAF. In other words, it was not a case 
of soldiers behaving badly as a consequence of a militarised masculine culture, but the 
outcome of a military strategy selectively targeting particular groups within the population, 
with a view to intimidating and terrorising them.  
  
In December 2011, protests were held in Tahrir Square against SCAF’s rule, so the army 
intervened to clear the square of the tents that had been set up and force the protestors to 
vacate the area. Images were captured on video of a man dressed in military attire dragging 
a woman across the floor, pulling her veil off, and stripping her of her abaya (long robe 
covering full body, usually in black) to reveal her underclothing. The incident, which became 
known as the ‘blue bra woman’, was widely disseminated in the national and international 
media as a case of army brutality and sexual violence. It provoked the largest women-led 
protest that the country has witnessed since the nineteenth century, when multitudes of 
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women had risen up calling for an end to British colonialism. Marshall Mohamed Tantawy, 
who presided over SCAF in 2011 issued an apology to Egyptian women for the assault that 
had occurred and promised to bring the perpetrators to justice. The soldiers were, however, 
never arrested or tried.  
 
There was no official condemnation from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis (or Muslims) 
and some of their members even publicly blamed the woman, questioning what she was 
doing in Tahrir Square. This was a clear move to delegitimise women’s political activism and 
discourage society from ‘allowing their women’ to participate in street politics. There followed 
a series of similar events:  
 
• On 8 March 2012, when women gathered to protest women’s rights on Women’s Day, 
they were subjected to sexual assault.  
 
• On the 2nd, 6th and 8th of June 2012, there were several cases of women protestors and 
female journalists being subjected to sexual assaults by groups of men in Tahrir Square 
(El Deeb 2012). 
 
• In November 2012 there was an increase in incidents (some involving rape) and, as a 
consequence, several political groups accused the Muslim Brotherhood of paying thugs 
to attack women in Tahrir Square (Whitehead 2012). 
 
• In December 2012, members of opposition political parties, revolutionaries, and citizens 
(who did not have any political party affiliation) gathered at el Etehadeya Palace to 
protest the presidential decree that centralised the executive, judiciary and legislative 
powers in his hands (see Tadros 2012c for further details) Their numbers were large. 
Citizens belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movements organised a 
counter protest. The latter firmly believed that it was their responsibility to defend the 
president and the legitimacy of his regime from a group of thugs and fuloul, meaning 
remnants of the former regime (this is taken from an interview with an informant who is a 
member the Muslim Brotherhood). Such testimony is corroborated by three victims of the 
counter protest in interviews. Each said that when they were captured, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafis accused them of being Mubarak loyalists and paid thugs out to 
destroy a democratically elected president and his regime.  
 
In January 2013, on the second anniversary of the revolution, 25 incidents of sexual assault 
occurred, all following the same pattern and implemented in the same systematic way.  
 
On 25 January 2013 a women-led march poured into Tahrir Square and greatly contributed 
to the energy and numbers of the protestors. Yet on the same day, after it became dark in 
Tahrir Square, men organised in groups began to target women for sexual assault. Shoft 
Taharosh, a youth-led initiative that was formed in 2012 to address incidences of sexual 
assault, reported dealing with 19 cases of assault, six of which required medical intervention. 
This is in addition to other cases of assaulted women they became aware of1.  
 
The counter argument is that revolutionary forces have also been engaged in violence 
against the government, most notably through the torching of public buildings, and targeting 
the presidential palace. However, the power is asymmetrical. Youths throwing stones and 
Molotov cocktails are very differently armed to the various corps of the security forces and 
the Muslim Brotherhood militias. Moreover, there were no reported incidents of captured 
security men being violated or assaults on women from the Islamist movements.  
                                               
1 www.facebook.com/Shoft.Ta7rosh 
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2.1  Patterns of political violence  
 
Irrespective of the actor (army, Islamists, unknown groups of men), irrespective of who is in 
power (SCAF followed by the Muslim Brotherhood) and irrespective of the kind of sexual 
violence perpetrated, there are are a number of common features in these acts of sexual 
assault: 
  
(i) they take place in squares and public spaces associated with protests 
(ii) they happen during times when protests and demonstrations are held 
(iii) the assaulted are disproportionately activists, whether women or men (even though 
there have been assaults on citizens who have no history of political activism) 
(iv) sexual violence is used in conjunction with other forms of violence 
(v) sexual violence is not enacted on a one-to-one basis but through a group of men, 
collectively and simultaneously assaulting the victim  
(vi) sexual assault does not occur in a passing moment, but is sustained over a period of 
time.  
 
There is, however, a marked difference in the use of sexual violence by the army and other 
actors. In the case of the army, their identity was known on account of the uniform. Yet by 
July 2012, the army had retreated from governance, effectively leaving the country in the 
hands of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. 
Under this rule, the identity of the perpetrators was less obvious: sometimes clearly and 
visibly members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, yet other times unknown.  
 
Incidents of sexual assault from June 2012 up until January 2013 show a striking pattern in 
the manner in they were enacted, indicating that they were systematic and orchestrated. In 
analysing several incidents in Tahrir Square, Shash (2013) argued that they have common 
characteristics:  
 
These incidents are believed to be organised because they take place in the same 
way and sometimes around the same area. The pattern is, it starts with around  
15–20 men who would surround a woman or two, they put their hands together, and 
they increase during the harassment to around 50 men. They form two circles, an 
inner one that would be attacking the women, harassing, groping, assaulting them 
and ripping off their clothes trying to get them naked, and an outer circle that protects 
the inner one and attacks any man who tries to save the girls (Shash 2013).  
 
Farah Shash notes that the perpetrators of assault often carry knives and other weapons. 
From the victims’ accounts, it is evident that these objects are intended to inflict harm and 
terrorise the assaulted, as well as anyone trying to save them. 
 
A large number of the incidents, notes Shash (2013), took place during times of protest – in 
Tahrir Square and in the streets leading to the square. Two spots in particular saw repeated 
incidents on different occasions: at the entrance of Mohamed Mahmoud Street and at 
Hardees restaurant in front of the square. The testimony of one woman who was assaulted, 
and whose account was documented by El Nadim Center where she sought treatment, bears 
witness to this pattern:  
 
I was going home from work at around 7.30pm, on the 25th of January 2013, I took a 
taxi and we arrived at Tahrir Square at around 9. I found that the metro is not working 
so I went back up to find another transportation mean, several men started gathering 
around me, it was very crowded. One man was behind me, he shouted to the other 
men ‘don’t push!’ and he pushed me on another man in front of me, I found more than 
50 men gathered around me in a circle, they started touching every part of my body 
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and I started screaming, they started ripping off my clothes, they ripped off my top, 
then my shoes, pants, the shorts I was wearing under my pants and they left me with 
my undergarments. They started inserting their fingers inside me very harshly and 
repeatedly, from the front and the back, I tried to stand up but they would push me 
back on the ground, they dragged me from my hair in the water and the mud, groped 
every part of my body and inserted their fingers. That went on for 3 or 4 hours. There 
were two men who were trying to rescue me, one of them was hit on his head and his 
head was injured and he was bleeding but he kept holding on to me; trying to rescue 
me, but then the men starting getting out blades and knives and used them to 
threaten anyone who would try to save me. They dragged me to the round about 
circle in the middle of Tahrir square and pushed me inside one of the tents, and the 
harassment and molestation is ongoing throughout all this and I kept on screaming. 
The tent collapsed on us, they dragged me from under it and took me back to the 
street and I felt a sharp object being inserted into me and I was in extreme pain, and I 
started bleeding from my genitals. I was hit on my head after that and I lost 
conscious, and when I woke up I found that the two men who were trying to save me, 
took me inside the building and the men who were assaulting and raping me tried to 
break down the building’s door. A woman took me inside her apartment and gave me 
Abaya [a coat like garment covering full body] to cover myself with. When the 
ambulance came, the ambulance doctor covered me up and my face with a white 
cloth and I was bleeding still. He told the men when I was getting out of the building 
that I died and they still attacked the ambulance car and were trying to stop it and 
break the door, I heard the doctor telling the driver, don’t stop… don’t stop no matter 
what or she will be killed! (El Nadeem, in Shash 2013) 
 
The above story is highly illustrative of the patterns of sexual assault witnessed in Tahrir 
Square and its vicinity. The way in which the woman was captured, and then circles of men 
formed around her suggest there is a high level of co-ordination that is intended to keep her 
trapped and prevent others from getting to her. The rape of the woman with sharp objects is 
intended to inflict extreme injury and cannot be simply interpreted as sexual assault for 
personal gratification. One common element in all of the accounts is the absence of police on 
the scene. It is unclear why there has not been a single incident in which the police have 
interfered to save women. The fact that the ambulance arrived on the scene to carry the 
victim in the account above suggests that the emergency services had been notified, yet 
surprisingly, arrived unaccompanied by police to protect the woman or those trying to help 
her.  
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3  The multiple agencies of men in politically 
motivated violence 
 
From an agential point of view, it is important to note that the clear dichotomy of men as 
assaulters and women as its victims is incongruent with the politics of organised sexual 
violence deciphered in the Egyptian case study. In at least one instance, the attackers who 
assaulted women in Tahrir Square were accompanied by women whose presence, it was 
believed, was planned and intended to provide a cover up to the ‘sexual assault operations’ 
(from interviews). There have also been incidents of positive deviance where men at el 
Ettehadeya have refused to contribute to the sexual assault and have sought to convince 
others to stop. One interviewee, who was assaulted, emphasised that a young Salafi man 
who was part of the group that captured her kept on asking the mob to stop assaulting her. 
She explained that she continues to be in touch with him to this day via facebook, and is very 
grateful to his role in saving her (he was responsible for returning her after she was 
captured).  
 
Moreover, some men have played key roles in combating women’s exposure to assault. 
Failure to acknowledge the psychological distress caused to men unable to defend their 
female friends, relatives or fellow citizens being assaulted represents a major deficit in the 
scholarship on sexual violence. Carpenter (2006: 96) emphasises that men’s pain in 
witnessing women’s sexual assault cannot be downplayed:  
 
it is important to address the psycho-social harm to men of being forced to witness 
the sexual torture of their female relatives in time of war. The literature on sexual 
violence against women has often emphasized the assault of women as a means to 
communicate messages to enemy men (Brownmiller 1994), but there has been very 
little specific effort to recognize the trauma of such atrocity for the male relatives of 
the victims. 
 
Men’s experience of such pain cannot simply be interpreted as a form of masculine anxiety 
over their honour, but also out of humane empathy with the suffering of other human beings 
(Tadros 2013). 
3.1  Sexual violence against men 
 
Historically, feminists have struggled to make sexual violence perpetrated against women in 
wars and conflicts recognised as a crime in its own right and appropriate redress measures 
taken. However, the emphasis on women as victims of wars instigated by men enforces 
harmful constructions of feminine and masculine identities whereby men are presented in the 
narratives of war as consistently being the offenders and never as victims. A growing body of 
literature has, however, brought to the fore the importance of recognising men as victims of 
sexual violence in conflicts (Carpentor, Pattel, Zarkov, Oosterhoff et al. 2004). Sexual 
violence against men as defined by the WHO includes a variety of acts including extreme 
forms such as rape and castration, as well as others such as enforced nudity and genital 
violence (for example, beatings of genitals or the administration of electric shocks to the 
genital area). 
 
In the post-Mubarak context of Egypt, interviews with the authors, testimonial evidence and 
cases treated by el Nadim Centre show that sexual assault in Egypt is not exclusively 
targeted at women. There has been a wide diversity in the kind of men who were sexually 
assaulted (young men, older men, men of heavy body build, men of very slight build, as well 
as different class, religion and educational background). Some men were revolutionary 
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activists who had participated in the Egyptian revolution and identified themselves as 
belonging to a particular political group/party. Others were revolutionaries who were against 
the regime but did not belong to a particular group. Others still had no political background 
whatsoever. The one common factor is that these men were all assaulted because they 
happened to be in protest spaces at political moments when opposition to SCAF or the 
Muslim brotherhood rule was being expressed.  
 
There are major variations in the kind of sexual assault that men are exposed to across 
different contexts. Extreme cases, for example, were reported in the DRC Congo where men 
were brutally raped at a large scale and some were kept in sexual slavery (Christian et al. 
2011). In Egypt, the form of sexual violence was less brutal, yet it included rape with objects, 
sexual molestation and forced nudity. While the incidents involve a complex interplay of 
driving factors there is one element in common across country contexts, namely the use of 
sexual violence against men as a strategy to undermine them within their group: to show that 
they are weaker than those who assault them in a bid to strip them of respect and status 
(Christian et al. 2011; Oosterhoff et al. 2004; Carpenter 2006). The perpetration of a sexual 
kind of violence against men is intended to cause not only physical damage, but 
psychological and mental trauma, by shaking men’s sense of identity and self. In highly 
patriarchal and homophobic societies, the intention behind sexually assaulting men is to 
emasculate and feminise them.  
 
Owing to the taboo nature of sexual violence, acts of sexual assault have often been 
classified in international criminal investigations under the guise of torture (Solangon and 
Patel 2012: 418). The media has often been more inclined to report women’s experiences of 
sexual violence than men’s (Zarkov 2001). Egypt is no exception: witness accounts 
appearing on television have been mostly women. Further, much of the human rights 
documentation in Egypt has tended to focus on women’s experiences of sexual assault, 
although there are exceptions (such as el Nadim Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence and Torture). 
 
In most societies, men are reluctant to report sexual violence (Wood 2008: 334). Solangon 
and Patel (2012: 422), for example, highlight how Sri Lankan prisoners were ‘too ashamed to 
report being sexual assaulted, as being labelled ‘a victim’ was deemed incompatible with 
their notions of masculinity.’ The documentation of sexual violence against men in Egypt, in 
particular in the revolutionary context of 2011–2012, has been extremely difficult. Men find it 
too shameful to admit to being subjected to sexual violence. One of the male interviewees 
recounted that in November 2011 the various youth revolutionary forces had gathered in 
Tahrir Square to object to SCAF’s rule. Bloody clashes ensued and the army built a concrete 
wall in Mohamed Mahmoud Street (one of the streets adjacent to Tahrir Square) to block 
protestors from reaching the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior. The Muslim brotherhood 
defended SCAF. One male interviewee who was sexually assaulted recounted that the 
Muslim Brotherhood formed a human shield to block the demonstrators from marching to 
Mohamed Mahmoud Street.2 As the protestors neared the human shield that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had formed, the latter began to sexually molest both the men and women. Men 
were ‘fingered’ in their behinds. He mentioned that after the confrontation, men were 
reluctant to talk about it and certainly when what happened was discussed, it was not 
referred to as sexual assault. 
 
In many other instances, men who have been assaulted refuse to describe their experience 
as one of subjugation to sexual assault, in particular if it has not involved direct contact with 
the genital area. Another male interviewee described his ordeal at el Ettehadeya in terms of 
                                               
2 The interviewee said that they recognised some of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood because they had been together 
during the protests against President Mubarak before his ousting and others were known to belong to the Islamist discourse 
(change to manner of speech) by their attire (long white clothing and beards) and their discourse. 
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subjugation to physical violence, not sexual assault (interview with author). He did not 
recognise the act of stripping him from his clothes as an act of sexual assault because their 
intention he insisted was not sexual gratification. He spoke of being stripped of his clothes as 
an act that was humiliating and degrading, but not one of a sexual nature. The resistance to 
acknowledge acts of stripping as forms of sexual assault (though it is internationally 
recognised as such) may be partly explained by the fact that the term conjures images of 
women being assaulted for sexual exploitation. In effect, to talk of being sexually assaulted 
as a man has strong connotations of emasculation. Not surprisingly, the narratives of men 
speak of being exposed to physical – not sexual – violence.  
 
El Nadim Center reports that acts of sexual violence were also perpetrated against male 
protestors, the most common of which included stripping them of their clothes, hitting them in 
sensitive parts of their body and ‘fingering them in their behinds’. The latter  amounts to rape 
(Farah 2013, background paper) according to the WHO definition, but not according to 
Egyptian law (see discussion below).  
 
In January 2013, an incident involving security forces stripping a middle aged man of his 
clothes was captured on video and broadcast on television (Urquhart 2013). Media outlets – 
who took a condemnatory stance towards the violence which citizens were being subjected 
to at the hands of the security forces – widely covered this incident, however, the act of 
stripping was not named in the news coverage as ‘sexual assault’. This was probably 
deliberate, intended to protect the victim’s masculinity. It was the women protestors who 
implicitly recognised the act of stripping this man of his clothes as one of sexual assault.  
 
In the subsequent protests organised by anti-sexual harassment groups, women’s 
organisations and youth revolutionary movements, women reversed the ‘Egypt’s women are 
not to be stripped’ chant which they had used in the demonstrations following the case of the 
‘blue bra woman’ to one which declared ‘Egypt’s men are not to be stripped!’ This is highly 
significant since the incident of the blue bra woman had been reported as one of sexual 
violation.  
 
Yet overall men’s experiences of sexual violence have been kept out of the legal advocacy 
efforts to hold the state accountable (discussed in more detail below). Patel argues that 
‘Advocacy and awareness of sexual violence against men must be evident in all sectors to 
annul misconceptions that men cannot be victims of sexual violence. Judicial and legal 
systems must be improved to combat impunity and to acknowledge male victims of sexual 
violence in all institutional decrees, statements, laws and resolutions’ (Patel 2012: 435). 
However, in the Egyptian case study, neither the media, the law, nor advocacy efforts have 
recognised men’s exposure to sexual violence.  
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4  Motives behind politically motivated sexual 
violence 
 
Transitions are often critical historical junctures with high levels of instability and volatility, 
Egypt being no exception. The overall context is one where there is a high level of violence 
and absence of human security. However, it is important to examine some of the possible 
factors as to why sexual violence was instrumentalised by those in powers against the 
opposition.  
4.1  Sexual violence to shame not only the individual but the 
wider community 
 
In a context where men’s, families’ and indeed whole communities’ sense of honour is 
intrinsically linked to women’s bodies, sexual assault is an act of shaming opponents. Sexual 
violence, in this context, argues Farah (interview December 2012) represents the highest 
form of violence that people can be subjugated to, precisely because of the social stigma 
associated with sexuality.  
 
Sexual violence is also intended to humiliate not only the person but the wider community. 
Public shaming has a collective impact because it destroys not only the victim but also the 
rest of the community who are often forced to watch (Zarkov 2001: 73; Zinsstag 2005: 139). 
These events were intended to be public spectacles where citizens could see for themselves 
what happens to men or women who dare to be politically active and engage in oppositional 
politics, or who even happen to be in the same space associated with political manoeuvrings.  
4.1.1  Sexual violence to intimidate 
 
Zarkov argues that in contexts where there are rigid controls over sexuality, the use of sexual 
violence plays precisely on notions of purity, masculinity, femininity and sexual norms. 
Sexual violence is intended to intimidate because, ‘It demonstrates the strength of the 
attacker against the weakness of the opponent who was not able to defend the victim’, and 
establishes the ‘superior masculinity of the assailant’ (Zarkov 2001: 77–81). Although Egypt 
(at the time of writing) cannot be described as experiencing a civil war, one captured woman 
was described by her Salafi captor as ‘his ghaneema’, his booty (interview with one of the 
captured women) . Reference to the captured woman as booty speaks of establishing a 
relationship of domination and conquest in attaining a woman whose body becomes the site 
for acting out superior masculinity. It is a term that has often been used in contexts of sexual 
violence in war, where capturing women is deemed as one of the ‘spoils of war’ (Naimark 
1995: 71, in Zinsstag 2005: 139). 
4.1.2  Sexual violence to effeminate men and denigrate women’s  
feminine value 
 
Notions of superior and inferior masculinities play on cultural norms and values regarding 
sexuality, gendered identities and hierarchies. Incidents involving violent assaults against 
opposition protestors have often been accompanied by a discourse that effeminates or 
demasculinises men. In November/early December 2012, when protestors’ tents in Tahrir 
Square were pulled to the ground, a discourse of vilification was used that specifically played 
on society’s norms around sexuality. For example, occupiers were referred to as 
homosexuals which, in the Egyptian context, signifies lacking in manliness and masculinity. 
Male protestors were also referred to as goats, with sexual allusions being made to what the 
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sheep (referring to the Islamists) would do to them (quotes from members belonging to the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Bassem youssef El Bernameg, episode broadcast on 14 December 
2012).  
4.1.3  Sexual violence was also used in the Egyptian context to inflict torture 
 
This is commensurate with other studies that indicate that the intention is not only to cause 
psychological trauma but extreme physical pain as well (Zinsstag 2005:139, 429; Patel, 
Parpart 47; Pope 1999: 353) The tactics used in Egypt of raping women and men through 
inserting sharp objects or fingers are a method of torture. Furthermore, the sustained acts of 
sexual violence and rape caused prolonged pain which amounts to torture.  
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5  Whose shame is it? Public norms and values 
on sexual assault 
5.1  Using religion to justify and endorse sexual violence 
 
The political juncture during which incidents of politically motivated sexual assault were being 
reported was one in which Egyptian society was deeply polarised between those who 
endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood regime and those who were against it. In this context, 
some religious leaders, who empathised with the Muslim Brotherhood on account of their 
religious credentials, used the platforms they had to legitimise politically motivated sexual 
violence against protestors. 
  
Against the backdrop of very conservative social mores around sexuality prevailing in 
society, the opposition was also accused of sexual promiscuity, to the point of showing how 
their sexual deviance merits their subjugation to sexual violence. During the eighteen days of 
uprising against President Mubarak, the state-sponsored media accused the revolutionaries 
who built tents in Tahrir Square of engaging in illicit sexually promiscuous behaviour (Tadros 
2012). By and large, such a discourse was discredited after the ousting of President Mubarak 
as a ploy to discourage people from empathising with the demonstrators and joining them. 
However, the Islamists’ discourse reproduced the same vilification of the opposition by 
appealing to people’s moral and sexual value system, except that it amplified the idea that 
they were not only socially illegitimate, but religiously as well.  
 
Women who went out to protest were represented as deviant, of questionable moral 
character, sexually promiscuous and deserving of sexual assault. Gradually, the image of the 
Egyptian woman who fought side by side with her male counterpart in liberating the country 
from a dictatorship was being replaced with the image of the pious woman who knew her 
place, did not meddle in affairs that were not hers and who did not venture into ‘men’s 
places’ where she put herself at risk. As discussed earlier, in December 2012, protestors 
gathered in Tahrir were described as harbouring condoms, women’s contraceptive devices, 
alcohol and foodstuffs. The message being conveyed to the wider public was clear: these 
were sexually promiscuous protestors who violated religious precepts. This was the same 
discourse as that of the Mubarak regime, except that now deviant sexuality was entangled 
with religious violations.  
 
Since women’s ‘value’ lay in their sexual purity and chastity, the Islamists sought to tarnish 
the female protestors’ reputation as sexually lewd, amoral women who lack femininity and 
religious piety. Shortly after the sexual assault and rape of women in Tahrir Square on  
25 January 2013, one of the protest slogans read, ‘Egypt’s girls are a red line (not to be 
crossed)’. On the Salafi television network al Hafez, Sheikh Abou Islam, a prominent 
preacher said that: 
 
Egypt’s girls are not a red line... these women who are naked, indecent, and 
prostitutes are not a red line, they are going there to be raped: nine tenths of them 
are crusadettes (women crusaders) and the other tenth are women who have no men 
to control them, they are widows who have no one to revere or to put them right – 
shame on you, where is your femininity? Where is the femininity that is due by 
religious law? These women are like ogres with their unruly hair.... she devils called 
women.  
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The inferences from Sheikh Al Islam’s words are important for understanding the 
construction of the narrative that justifies politically motivated sexual violence against women 
protestors.  
 
In summing up the portrayal of women by Islamic leaders and the military, a number of key 
characteristics are discernable:  
  
First, there is a focus on these women as ‘fallen’ – i.e. they are not the kind of women 
respected members of society should empathise with because their moral character is 
deplorable – and hence they are unlike the womenfolk of one’s family, friends and relations, 
the good Muslims.  
 
Second, these women belong to the religious ‘other’. In this context, the rhetoric fuels the 
anti-Christian sentiment that exists in a deeply sectarian society against the indigenous 
Christian population. By associating these women with the Crusaders, it also suggests that 
they are the enemies of Islam, coming from the West. The ‘othering’ of religious minorities 
has been a key strategy deployed to mobilise people in support of the Islamists – the true 
defenders and guardians of Islam. Hence misogyny is combined with religious bigotry to 
demonise women through their sexuality.  
 
Third, the notion that women want to be raped is intrinsically associated with their fallen 
moral character and their deviant sexuality. In essence, as a consequence of their lack of 
conformity to particular notions of femininity – i.e. submissiveness and silence – these are 
women who deserve to be violated. It is a form of chastisement that they merit. This is highly 
significant in that the discourse of the Islamists at el Etehedayya in December 2012 also 
referred to the need to discipline/chastise these women who were represented as deviant.  
5.2  Public perceptions of sexual assault 
 
There were 3 focus groups undertaken with women and one with men in each of the four 
governorates (see details above). The focus groups were held in March, less than two 
months after the sexual violence witnessed in Tahrir Square. When asked about whether 
they are aware of such incidents, almost all the participants in all the focus groups replied in 
the positive. They had heard about such incidents from the media. Despite the great variation 
in age, gender, religion, educational background and location, the main explicator of the 
responses was whether participants were in favour of the current regime or not. It reflected 
the deep polarisation in Egyptian society between those in favour of the existing Islamist 
regime versus those dissatisfied with its performance or opposed to it.3  
 
In every single community in which the focus groups were held, there was a striking 
difference in the interpretation of events in Tahrir between those endorsing and those against 
the current regime. Let us compare the perceptions of women from the same poor 
community in Cairo. The women participants in the focus groups in Cairo who had voted 
against the Muslim brotherhood in the presidential and parliamentary elections whether they 
were young, old, working or non-working categorically blamed the Muslim Brotherhood-led 
government for the incidence of sexual assault that took place in Tahrir Square. As one 
woman said, ‘the Muslim Brotherhood are doing this so that women would go back to their 
homes and not go out to protest. This is all part of a strategy to scare women into not going 
out on the streets.’  
 
                                               
3 It was possible to decipher their political orientation from question asking ‘who did you vote for and why in the last 
parliamentary elections’ and ‘who do you intend to vote for in the forthcoming parliamentary elections and why’. Few participants 
said they do not intend to vote because they had voted for the Freedom and Justice party and were disappointed by the broken 
promises and do not intend to vote in the forthcoming parliamentary elections (the date of which is yet undecided).  
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Another said, ‘this is all part and parcel of a plan to make women stay at home: it’s the same 
with all the harassment women face on the streets everyday’. Yet even within that group, 
there were some women who blamed it on the revolutionary youth: ‘If those who organise the 
protests can’t protect Tahrir Square, then they should not call upon people to participate. It is 
their responsibility to make these places safe and not take lightly people’s security’. Others 
went further, blaming the perpetration of assaults on the protestors themselves. ‘They go to 
demand their rights and they harass the women, this is not right, they should not be doing 
that’. This was an indeed perplexing response that was reiterated across many focus groups, 
it suggests that the wider public does not necessarily see these assaults as politically 
motivated but as reflective of one of the ills of Egyptian society: men harassing women. Only 
a few of the women in the two focus groups in Cairo who happened to be against the regime 
explained the incidents in a manner that recognised sexual violence as political. One woman 
said that it was men who implanted themselves in the crowds with the purpose to intimidate. 
This sense of a conspiracy being drawn was also evident in the opinion of another who said, 
‘these cases of harassment being shown on TV are being shown by the media so people 
would feel scared and not go down to the streets’. 
 
This is to be contrasted with the views that were expressed in another focus group whose 
participants strongly endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood’s regime. In that focus group, they 
tended to place the responsibility more on the women who went down to Tahrir, asking ‘what 
is she doing there in the middle of all of these men in the first place?’ One participant 
suggested that the responsibility for sexual harassment is dual: on the man who has sexual 
repression and on the woman who wears revealing clothing. Unlike the focus groups in Cairo 
with the women who were critical of the regime, the female participants in this group argued 
that some women who were sexually assaulted deserved it if they happened to be 
immodestly dressed.  
 
In one focus group with men in Beni Suef, one man, 30, said ‘the woman who goes down to 
Tahrir Square in the first place is a thug and no self-respecting woman’. A 22 year old man in 
the same focus group explained, ‘the people who went down to Tahrir Square on the 25th of 
January [2011] were real revolutionaries but today the ones that go there are thugs’. Two of 
the men associated women who protest today with drug taking and homosexuality. This 
pitting of the honourable revolutionaries of two years ago against the thugs of today is in tune 
with the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative: when they participated in the revolution, 
revolutionary activity was legitimate; when activism is turned against them, it is vilified as the 
work of a group of thugs. All eight in the group agreed that women should not go out to 
protest. The majority of the men in the focus group blamed incidents of sexual harassment 
blamed the ‘thugs’ and the opposition for the incidents that happened in Tahrir Square. One 
went so far as to say the women who go ‘to Tahrir Square go there because they want to be 
harassed’. Three of the eight were of this view, and seven of the eight believed that women 
had some responsibility for the assaults, because they should not have been there in the first 
place. Two in the group said that the freedom that society witnessed after the revolution (one 
which none of the women ever spoke of in other focus groups) was to blame – women 
should not leave their homes except for war. In another part of the conversation when they 
were asked what do they watch on television, they all said religious channels, and mentioned 
el nass, al Hafez and the Muslim Brotherhood’s channel, ‘Misr 25th’.  
 
Interestingly, in a focus group with men in one of Cairo’s shanty towns, where it happens that 
participants were against the current regime, the men’s discourse was very different. These 
men strongly believed that women have the right to go protest and those responsible for 
failing to protect women were the government and the president himself. Yet they too were 
more cautious about the dangers that now await women should they go out to protest in 
Tahrir.  
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In Qena, in a focus group with men, the responses again showed how political orientation 
influenced the responses on sexual harassment. One man who was more critical of the 
Islamists argued that women should never be exposed to sexual harassment, irrespective of 
what they are wearing and argued that they are not to blame for the assault. Another man 
who supported the Nour Salafi party believed that the cases of sexual harassment were due 
to women’s attire. ‘I am against harassment but if a woman is wearing respectful clothing, no 
one would harass her. Have you ever seen a woman in the niqab [face veil] being harassed?’  
 
Most women who participated in the focus groups in all governorates expressly argued that 
since women now know that Tahrir is not safe, it is their responsibility not to go there. Even 
the young people in Cairo, such as Beni Suef and Minya who said that women should not be 
intimidated and they should continue going out to protest, when asked whether they 
themselves would go, they said that though they had previously participated in protests, they 
would no longer go because it is not safe anymore. One young woman suggested that, 
‘women must find another way of expressing their opposition other than going out in the 
streets.’ One middle aged woman suggested: ‘political work should be left to the men. 
Women should focus on their work and their homes.’  
 
If the voices captured in the focus groups are indicative of the mood regarding women’s 
activism, then one can assert that fear has been instilled in the hearts of many women and 
their families, and it is unlikely that women’s presence in Tahrir Square will be anything like it 
was two years ago when millions participated in protests. Hence, if one of the motives of 
politically motivated sexual assault is to instil fear, it seems to have by and large succeeded.  
 
However, the religious leaders’ discourse suggesting that women go to Tahrir Square to be 
sexually assaulted had hardly any resonance with the women in the focus groups. Most 
women responded strongly to the query on whether women solicit assault, by expressing 
comments such as: ‘no woman wants to be assaulted, what kind of talk is that!’ 
 
It is noteworthy that across all focus groups with women, irrespective of whether in urban or 
rural areas, in Cairo or the upper Egyptian or Delta governorates, there is a common 
message that women were unanimously reporting: harassment on the streets has increased 
dramatically in the past two years. They cited harassment, thuggery and theft as the three 
top forms of violence which they feel vulnerable to. Perpetrators of sexual harassment, they 
point out, are now more emboldened than ever to go beyond the passing comments about 
their beauty to making sexually explicit comments about women’s body parts, making sexual 
advances and molesting women by touching parts of their bodies. Women reported feeling 
humiliated, denigrated and helpless. They complained that sexual harassment is met with 
inaction; there are no interventions to put a stop to it. Across different contexts, women were 
conveying the same message: exposure to sexual harassment on a daily basis is having a 
toll on their lives. Some said that they have noticed that some young women are increasingly 
responding to sexual molestation by resorting to violence – shoving men who try to grab 
them or retrieving a knife from their handbags and threatening to use it. Other participants in 
focus groups point out that it is having a toll on women in the household: some mothers are 
taking it out on their children by yelling and hitting them more fequently. Yet participants in 
focus groups had different interpretations of who was behind their increased susceptibility to 
violence. Some women, in particular those against the current government, blamed the 
Muslim Brotherhood for using a rhetoric that was antithetical to women’s rights. Others 
argued that the fact that the country is going through a constant stream of protests is 
undermining its overall stability and preventing the government from doing its job. The link 
between sexual assault in Tahrir Square and harassment in their daily lives was captured 
well by one housewife who said ‘it’s all about the same thing, discouraging women from  
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being out on the streets’. It is clear that though the nature of sexual assault in public protest 
spaces is different to that occurring in the streets of Egypt, they both have the same intention 
of sending signals that women should limit their mobility, not venture out in public space 
unless needed. 
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6  Seeking recognition through the street and 
justice through the law 
 
During 2012 there was a silence around politically motivated forms of sexual assault. While it 
would not be surprising that the ruling powers would deliberately attempt to obscure their 
occurrence, the opposition and the media were also avoiding the exposure and public 
denouncement. Revolutionary and oppositional forces had not wanted to raise the issue of 
politically motivated sexual assault out of fear that this would intimidate citizens from 
participating in demonstrations in Tahrir Square, or at least families would prevent female 
members from taking part, fearing their assault. In view of the central importance of women’s 
political activism for the success of any demonstration in Tahrir, the spread of fear and 
rumours would significantly undermine their revolutionary efforts.  
 
Moreover, throughout 2012, individual women had come out and spoken about their ordeal, 
and specifically named the perpetrators. However, there was no collective naming of the 
incidents as politically motivated, and no shaming of those believed to be behind them 
(namely the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis). What broke the floodgates was the intensity 
and scope of sexual harassment witnessed against women activists on the second 
anniversary of the Egyptian revolution on 25 January 2013. On the night of the assault, at 
Cafe Riche (a coffee shop in Talaat Harb in close proximity to Tahrir Square) where survivors 
of assault had informally gathered, a decision was taken to come out in public and share 
their ordeal. Various movements who work on feminist issues and who work on sexual 
harassment in public spaces came out to demand that the matter be recognised for what it is, 
and they held the Muslim Brotherhood accountable. The independent media responded by 
granting the matter extensive coverage, while hosting women survivors to tell their stories. 
Lamis Al Hadeedy, who presents one of the most widely watched political analysis 
programmes, dedicated a whole episode to politically motivated sexual assault, at the end of 
which she said: ‘I apologise for the delay in addressing this issue in my programme. We 
knew it has been happening for a long time, but I feared tarnishing the image of Tahrir, I 
feared scaring people from going to Tahrir, but I was wrong to think that’ (‘Al Qahera Wal 
Nass, CBC, 10pm GMT, 3.2.2012). 
 
Women’s rights groups organised several interventions following 25 January 2013 to expose 
politically motivated sexual assaults that took place in Tahrir Square and its joining areas. A 
statement signed by political parties, youth initiatives, non-governmental organisations and 
many individuals named the acts as politically motivated, and shamed the actors whom they 
held responsible: the Muslim Brotherhood and the government. The statement was signed by 
non-governmental organisations working in women’s rights, human rights, human 
development and poverty alleviation, as well as organisations representing women lawyers 
and various other groups. The statement was also signed by leading youth revolutionary 
movements, coalitions and initiatives as well as those that specifically work on sexual 
harassment. The statement was signed by seven political parties of socialist, left of centre 
and right of centre leanings. None of the Islamist parties or any religious organisation signed 
the statement.4 
                                               
4 The signatory organisations are: El-Nadim Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence; New Woman foundation; The 
Woman and Memory forum; Baheya Ya Masr, Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance; Arrow of Confidence; The 
Egyptian Women’s Union; Voice of Egyptian Women; Egyptian Women for Change; Egyptians Against Religious Discrimination; 
Act Egypt; National Egyptian Development Association; Consultancy council for Coptic Associations; Association for  Freedom 
of Thought and Expression; Daughters of Earth; Egyptian Women’s Union; Bashaier for  Development of Society; The Alliance 
for Arab Women; Women’s Parliament; Shoft Taharosh; One World Foundation for Development and Civil Society Care; 
Fouada Watch; Tawafok Center for Legal Assistance and Development; Society for Health Improvement in Cairo; Cairo Center 
for Development and Human Rights; Egyptians Against  Religious Discrimination; Roueya for Development and Media Studies; 
Revolutionary Socialists; Egyptian Democratic Academy; Egyptian Democratic Institution; Fares Foundation; Egyptian 
Foundation for Family Development; Egyptian Initiative for Women Lawyers; National Union for the  Independence of Lawyers;  
Enlightened Egypt; Youth movements and initiatives; Egyptian Creativity Front; Positive Movement; Youth for Justice and 
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Moreover, women and men organised a march on the 6 February 2013 to condemn the 
practices and call for the government to be held accountable. Women held high knives to 
express their preparedness to protect themselves through self defense. The media also 
played an important advocacy role, hosting women who have been sexually assaulted and 
activists whose work is to make Tahrir Square a place free of assault to share their 
testimonies. Victims filed lawsuits and human rights organisations contributed to the 
provision of evidence to be presented to the Prosecutor. However, legal advocacy proved to 
be very difficult for redressing injustice.  
6.1  Legal advocacy  
 
Zinsstag (2005: 139) argues that in order for the criminal justice system to address sexual 
violence, it would have to deliver first on accountability by ensuring that the perpetrators of 
past atrocities answer for their crimes, by publicly acknowledging their criminal responsibility 
and their violation of the law. Second, the criminal justice system would have to ensure 
impunity to be achieved through the prosecution of the perpetrators for their acts, and third, 
deterrence through signalling to the wider community that such acts will not be tolerated.  
 
These three conditions for securing justice are conspicuously missing in the current Egyptian 
context because (i) the law itself is inadequate for recognising and addressing sexual 
assault; and (ii) there is no political desire to name and shame the perpetrators and 
announce a zero tolerance policy towards all forms of sexual assault. Though these two 
factors are intertwined, for analytical purposes, each will be dealt with separately.  
Criminal law in Egypt has been largely modelled along Napoleonic French law, dating back 
to 1882. Prior to the adoption of Napoleonic principles, the country was governed by 
uncodified Shariah (Islamic law) and by a number of laws that were administered through the 
courts. The Penal Code in effect today was promulgated in 1937 and has been subject to a 
number of amendments since then (Reza 2011).  
 
The Penal Code is presented over four books. Out of over 400 provisions that represent the 
Penal Code, there are only three articles that specifically deal with sexual assault (articles 
267, 268 and 269).5 These articles in the third book feature in ‘Law number 58 of 1937 of the 
Penal Code’. These specific articles have not been amended since 1937.  
 
Article 267 states that whoever has sexual intercourse with a female without her consent will 
be subject to imprisonment with temporary labour. It stipulates that, ‘the penalty is higher, 
namely, mandatory life imprisonment, if any of a list of aggravating factors is present: if the 
offender is a blood relation of the victim, or is responsible for her upbringing or supervision or 
has (other) authority over her, or is a paid domestic employee of the victim or of one of the 
other persons just described’ (Reza 2011: 22). The requirements for the act to be recognised 
as punishable under article 267 are that it involves vaginal penetration through a penis, and 
second that it occurs without a female’s consent.  
 
Should the judge have reason to doubt that vaginal penetration occurred, article 267 will not 
be applied. Equally, if the woman cannot provide sufficient proof that penetration occurred 
against her consent the judge can reject the application of article 267, in which case, if the 
judge has reason to believe that she consented to the sexual intercourse, he can hold her 
accused of adultery. If the woman is married, and she is accused of committing adultery, she 
                                                                                                                                                  
Freedom, Revolutionary Socialists; Lotus Youth; The Free Egyptians; National Unity Youth; The Free Egyptian Woman; The 
signatory political parties are: Egyptian Social Democratic Party; Socialist Popular Alliance Party; Egyptian Popular Current; Al 
Dostour Party; Masr Alhorreya Party; Al Masreyeen Al Ahrrar; Egyptian Socialist Party. 
5 There is one article that may apply to verbal assault: article 306 punishes incidents of verbal insults, for example cat calling in 
the street. The sentence can range from a fine of LE100 (equivalent to £9.50 GBP) or one month in prison.   
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can be punished with detention for up to two years under articles 274 and 275 (Reza 2011: 
23).  
 
A number of important deficiencies in this article are worth noting. First, the Egyptian penal 
code does not have formal or explicit recognition of rape (ightesab) in any of the three 
articles dealing with sexual assault. Second, while not articulated in any explicit terms, article 
267 does not recognise non-consensual acts involving non-vaginal penetration. Third, it only 
applies to actual acts and does not tackle attempted rape. Fourth, article 267 does not allow 
for the recognition of women as perpetrators of rape against other women (through for 
example the use of objects).  
 
The second relevant article, 268, punishes ‘hatk ‘ard’, the literal meaning of which is ‘violation 
of honour’, but it is practically used to refer to indecent assault by force or threats or attempts 
at indecent assault (Reza 2011:22). Under article 268, indecent assault is punishable by 
three to seven years imprisonment. The penalty is higher if the victim is under 16 years of 
age or if the aggravating principles cited for article 267 apply. There is no definition of what 
hatk ‘ard means and it has been left to the prerogative of the judge to determine how to 
assess the violation at hand. Generally judges have applied article 268 to incidents involving 
non-penetration which have mostly involved the touching of sexual parts of a person’s body. 
The absence of a definition of hatk ‘ard has created a legal loophole. One lawyer mentioned 
that where judges wish to mitigate the penalty out of ‘mercy’ for the assaulter, they can try to 
circumvent the application of article 268 by claiming that the damage caused has been 
limited, or that there is insufficient proof regarding the exact occurrence of indecent assault.  
Article 269 addresses indecent/sexual assault which is enacted without the use of force or 
threat (or attempts thereof) and applies to incidents where the victim is under 18 and more 
than 7 years of age. The requirement for application does not require evidence of use of 
force. The punishment under article 269 is detention.  
 
One of the flagrant deficiencies in the current legislation is the absence of recognition of men 
as victims of sexual assault. Generally, men’s experiences are often hidden under rubric 
terms of ‘abuse’, ‘torture’ or ‘mutilation’’ (Sivakumaran in Solangon and Patel 2012: 424). 
This is certainly the case in Egypt where prevalent attitudes within society and among male 
victims of sexual violence means that men rarely press charges for being victims of sexual 
assault. The recognition of men’s exposure to harassment and assault in the law will require 
an amendment to article 267 so that the victims are not exclusively women, and so that 
penetration is not only recognised as vaginal. Moreover, articles 268 and 269 need to be 
modified to make it more explicit that women and men can be victims of indecent assault, 
and specify the multiple ways in which this can occur (see below).  
 
Feminist and human rights organisations in Egypt have long lobbied for reforms to the 
criminal  law to address the loopholes that undermine its effectiveness in dealing with 
incidents of sexual assault.6 A taskforce for mention who they are combating sexual violence 
was established in 2008 involving 25 member organisations working in the areas of human 
rights, women’s rights and community development, as well as law firms and independent 
lawyers.7 The aims of the taskforce were to combat sexual violence more generally, engage 
in legal advocacy and provide a platform for co-ordinated action between both legal and 
psychological services for victims. The taskforce developed a draft bill to deal with the 
inadequacies and achieve equality between women and men.  
 
The first major problem with the existing criminal law that the proposed bill sought to tackle 
was the legal definitions used to describe crimes related to sexual violence. They proposed a 
                                               
6 The legal advocacy component draws heavily from a paper by  Farah Shash, psychologist at El Nadeem Center for the 
Rehabilitation of victims of torture and violence.  
7 For a full list of names see http://eipr.org/pressrelease/2010/12/19/1060. 
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replacement of terms such as ‘Hatk ‘ard’ which means indecent assault, ’Fe’l Fadeh’ which 
means inappropriate act in public and ‘Khadsh Hayaa Onsa’ which means outraging the 
modesty or shyness of a female with terms such as rape, sexual assault and harassment. 
The proposed amendments to the law suggest the replacement of the phrase, ‘indecent 
assault and corrupting of manners’, with the phrase ‘sexual crimes’ in Article 1 of the title of 
Part IV of the third book of the Penal Code. They also proposed that Article 267 recognise 
that, ‘Whoever rapes a person shall be punished by life imprisonment or rigorous 
imprisonment. Rape is considered any penetration or forced penetration of a victim without 
his or her consent, whether with sexual organs or any other instrument and whether it be 
through the vagina, mouth or anus’ [italics mine]. This is intended to broaden the definition of 
what is rape and to recognise the possibility of both women and men as perpetrators and as 
victims.  
 
The taskforce proposed that Article 268 recognise sexual assault as any indecent act 
directed towards a person without his or her consent that involves the victim’s body and loins 
and that does not amount to rape. They also proposed that Article 268 recognise that, 
‘Whoever sexually assaults another person shall be punished by rigorous imprisonment for 
not less than three years and not more than seven years.’ 
 
The draft bill also proposed a revision to Article 269 to recognise men, as well as women, as 
victims of sexual harassment: ‘Whoever sexually harasses another against his will, whether 
male or female, by following, pursuing or otherwise using direct or indirect sexual or obscene 
language or over the telephone or the internet or similar means of communication, or sends 
messages with sexual pictures, texts or inscriptions, shall be punished by imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding one year and a fine of not lower than five hundred pounds and not 
exceeding five thousand pounds or by just one of the aforementioned punishment. If the 
perpetrator is among those listed the second paragraph of Article 267 detention is 
mandatory.’  
 
Farah explained that the taskforce managed to secure the endorsement of the bill by one of 
the MPs of the former parliament,8 Dr Amr Hamzawy in the 2012 parliamentary round. 
However, the bill was blocked by some Freedom and Justice Party members, such as Azza 
El Garf (also referred to as Om Ayman) who rejected the bill on the basis that women and 
girls are responsible for sexual harassment (Tayel 2012). The bill never passed.  
 
Despite the existence of the Penal Code, and the articles relevant to sexual violence, the 
lawsuits that were waged by the interviewees who had been assaulted did not lead to the 
incrimination of the perpetrators, despite the physical evidence gathered and the witness 
accounts bearing testimony to the assaults. They did not receive a hearing in court and 
neither did the lawsuits filed relating to the incidents that happened on 25 January 2012. The 
General Prosecutor’s office has frozen these cases on account of the need for more 
investigation. This can mean their indefinite retention. Some activists argue that the 
politicisation of the General Prosecutor’s role may explain this legal inertia. The president 
has been criticised for selecting the General Prosecutor and the judiciary have argued that 
they should have been empowered to assume such a role.  
6.2  State complicity 
 
The government’s response suggested a promotion of a culture of impunity, first, by seeking 
to negate that the assaults were driven by a political strategy and second, by openly blaming 
the victims for their ordeal. In February 2013, the upper house, the Shura Council, a 
                                               
8 In June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the parliament which was inaugurated in January 2012 was 
unconstitutional because of irregularities in the electoral law.  
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consultative body which had taken over the legislative function of the state [in view of the fact 
that the lower house, the parliament, had been declared by the Supreme Constitutional Court 
null and void in June 2012] held a hearing on sexual harassment. The Shura Council, which 
is comprised of an Islamist majority, implicitly conveyed the message that women are 
responsible for eliciting sexual assault. For example, Adel Afifi, a prominent board member of 
the Salafi Party Al-Asala, put the blame squarely on women: ‘A woman who joins protests 
among thugs and street inhabitants should protect herself before asking the Ministry of 
Interior to offer her protection,’ Afifi said. He commented further that, ‘Women sometimes 
cause rape upon themselves through putting themselves in a position which makes them 
subject to rape’. Similar statements were made by another Salafi member, Salah Abdel 
Salam who argued that if women choose to protest in public spaces filled with thugs, then 
‘the woman is to be blamed’ (Taha 2013). 
 
Particularly disturbing is that members of the ruling party also implicitly conveyed the same 
blame on women for sexual assault. Reda Al Hefnawy of the Freedom and Justice party 
argued that, ‘Women should not mingle with men during protests... [...] How can the Ministry 
of Interior be tasked with protecting a lady who stands among a group of men?’ (Taha 2013). 
This demonstrates a high level of tolerance – to the point of complicity – on the part of the 
government.  
 
The response of the government is significant in the kind of signals given to the perpetrators, 
and the normative values it propagates about women’s political activism.  
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Conclusions and policy messages 
 
This paper has contributed to the literature on the use of politically motivated forms of sexual 
violence in contexts of transition. It argues that, in contrast to theories that explain sexual 
violence in opportunistic terms, through economic incentives, or in terms of military culture, 
the kind of sexual violence documented here is strategically used to humiliate, intimidate and 
politically cleanse the opposition. Such sexual violence capitalises on highly conservative 
and increasingly religiously-framed conceptions around sexuality.  
 
SCAF and the current regime have instrumentally used sexuality as a systematic tool of 
controlling political dissidence, against both women and men. Such use of sexuality was 
politically motivated, planned, and orchestrated in a consistent pattern of engagement.  
 
The political instrumentalisation of sexuality has taken various forms including through the 
discourses used and the practices enacted. Discourses have questioned the ‘manliness’ of 
the political opponents (mesh regala) and the reputation of the women (promiscuous and 
lewd). Practices have included rape, in particular through the use of fingers and objects, 
extreme forms of sexual molestation, stripping women and men nude and sexual torture 
through pain inflicted in the genital areas.  
 
The use of politically motivated sexual violence is intended to achieve several purposes 
including: 
 
a) To damage/destroy people’s sense of personal dignity and will to protest. 
b) To create a sense of helplessness in being unable to protect others from assault. 
c) To render fear in the hearts of protestors and discourage them from participating  
in protests. 
d) To generate rumours within the wider society of what awaits those who protest. 
 
This paper has argued that the political instrumentalisation of sexual violence by the Muslim 
Brotherhood is even more far-reaching than that of the previous authorities since it also uses 
religion to legitimise their political moves, in a way that stirs public empathy. 
 
The ability to bring about justice for the victims of violence has been impeded by the the 
current governance structures which have obscured the demarcations between those who 
rule, those who have perpetrated the acts of violence and the political role of the General 
Prosecution.  
 
However, the law itself contains several legal loopholes which need to be tackled if the 
violence that victims have been exposed to is to be recognised. Judges should be given less 
latitude to interpret the relevant articles in a way that substantially lessens the punishment, 
so that those responsible are held accountable. It may not be enough to change political 
mores overnight, however, it will give the right signals to those who consider resorting to 
such tactics of intimidation and shame.  
Policy implications 
For donors 
  
1. Politically motivated sexual violence is not only important to study in contexts of war and 
outbreak of high intensity conflict, but also in contexts of transitions. Comparisons with 
occurrences in Libya, Tunisia and Yemen and other contexts of transition may be 
particularly useful.  
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2. Raise in policy dialogues with the Egyptian government the need to convey a zero-
tolerance policy towards all forms of gender- and sexual-based violence against women 
and men.  
3. Support independent media, social media, citizen media and mass media in exposing, 
naming and shaming sexual violence. 
4. Support further research on sexual violence against men, and encourage its integration in 
mainstream policy work. 
5. Support initiatives that strengthen civil society actors’ awareness of how to use 
international law for advocacy on politically motivated sexual violence where national 
laws fall short. 
For civil society 
 
1. Recognising the causes of different forms of sexual violence. In some instances, shaming 
is not enough. There is a need for naming the perpetrators where there is evidence for it.  
2. Press the media to continue to feature persons who will share directly with the audience 
their accounts of sexual assault. 
3. Work with the media to support the positive representation of these men and women not 
as victims whose honour has been tarnished, but as citizens demanding their rights for 
accountability and justice . 
4. Continue to press the National Women’s Council and the Human Rights Council and 
other quasi-governmental organisations (Quangos) to press policymakers to recognise 
politically motivated sexual assault. 
5. Acknowledge sexual violence against men and actively support its coverage and make 
efforts to break the silence around it and de-tabooise it. 
6. Examine the possibility of resorting to international instruments for seeking justice if the 
local ones do not deliver. For example, in view of the level of physical brutality which 
accompanied the rape and sexual assault of women on 25th January, it may be 
worthwhile to examine whether these amount to crimes against humanity, and therefore 
can be referred to the international court of criminal justice.  
For government 
 
1. Reform law of the 1937 Penal Code along the lines suggested by the coalition on sexual 
violence.  
2. Enforce the existing law until a new one is issued. 
3. Give clear signals that there is a zero-tolerance policy towards the use of sexual violence 
for political purposes and towards those who disseminate messages that legitimise or 
encourage it. 
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